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FINDING ENDANGERED SPECIES A 
HOME IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The one process now going on that will take millions of years to 
correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of 




The impacts of species extinction are immense and irreversible. 
Species that were once found throughout the nation in abundant 
populations find themselves fighting for survival. They are contained in 
small populations in even smaller geographical ranges, often located 
wholly within the borders of one state.2 About half of the species 
included on the federal endangered species list are "intrastate" species, 
I EDWARD WILSON, BIOPHILlA, 121 (1984). 
2 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
("NAHB") (Approximately 521 of the 1082 species in the United States currently designated as 
threatened or endangered are found in only one state). 
489 
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experiencing all stages of their life cycle within a single state.3 While 
protections for these species exist within the Endangered Species Act 
("ESA"), recent events indicate the protections for intrastate species 
might be weakened, or completely eliminated in the near future.4 
In 1973, Congress passed the ESA5 under the Commerce Clause.6 
Although the Supreme Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of the 
ESA,7 some believe that it is in danger of future attacks.8 Precedent set 
within the last decade limits the scope of the Commerce Clause.9 
Additionally, several circuit courts agree about the strong constitutional 
status of the ESA, but remain divided in their reasoning. \0 This fractured 
jurisprudence remains a problem, creating instability for the ESA if the 
constitutionality of the ESA ever reaches the Supreme Court, where the 
new additions of Justices Roberts and Alito are certain to impact the 
Court's analysis." Whereas some ESA proponents believe that the 
Supreme Court's recent expansion of Commerce Clause authority over 
the regulation of intrastate goods will impact the ESA's application 
positively,12 this Comment proposes that judicial activism will ultimately 
determine the outcome of the ESA controversy. 13 
This Comment examines the controversial relationship between the 
ESA and the Commerce Clause. Part I provides an overview of the 
3/d. 
4 See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
5 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544 (1973). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (the "Commerce Clause"). 
7 The Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a mix of both facial challenges and "as applied" 
challenges to the regulation of certain activities under the ESA. While this is an important 
distinction in the law, the scope of this article only examines an "as applied" challenge to the ESA's 
constitutionality, whereby if found against the Act, would only be found unconstitutional as applied 
to the challenger's activity and not facially invalidated as a body of law. 
8 See Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the 
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private 
Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 924-25 
(2004); see also Michael C. Blumm and George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads, Wolves, and the 
Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 326-327 
(2004); see also David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: The 
Rehnquist Court's Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 789, 789 (2005); 
see also Jud Matthews, Turning the Endangered Species Act Inside Out?, 113 YALE L.1. 947, 954 
(2004). 
9 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (holding that the possession of a gun in a school 
zone is not economic activity and does not substantially affect interstate commerce); U.S. v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,610 (2000) (interpreting the "noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct" 
to be central to the holding in Lopez"). 
10 Matthews, supra note 8. 
II See infra notes 202-213 and accompanying text. 
12 Blumm, supra note 8, at 493. 
13 See infra notes 193-20 I and accompanying text. 
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Commerce Clause and the ESA.14 Part II reviews the evolution of the 
Commerce Clause and examines, in its current form, the Constitution's 
capacity to support the ESA. 15 Part III examines the likelihood of 
Supreme Court review of the ESA due to conflicting circuit court 
opinions and recent changes in the Supreme Court composition. 16 Part 
IV identifies several factors that endanger the ESA at the Supreme Court 
level. 17 The Comment concludes that, despite several seemingly 
favorable factors, the Commerce Clause framework is still inadequate to 
support the ESA, which remains in danger of a constitutional attack at 
the Supreme Court level. Though our current constitutional framework 
leaves the ESA vulnerable to attack, the ESA should not suffer as a result 
of our court system's shortcomings. Therefore, Part V proposes 
solutions to this inadequacy, including a shared responsibility between 
state and federal entltles, several legislative remedies, and a 
recommendation for the Supreme Court to adopt the Fifth Circuit's 
rationale. 18 Within these solutions, the Comment ultimately favors the 
comprehensive scheme rationale as applied to the ESA. Though not 
perfect in all respects, it is the solution that would allow for the broadest 
protection for all endangered species, and is therefore the most desirable 
among those in the environmental community. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In its simplest application, the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to make laws regulating interstate commerce. 19 Environmental 
laws were originally passed under the Commerce Clause because the 
environment was viewed primarily as a commodity to be regulated?O 
More recent environmental laws like the ESA protect species even 
14 See infra notes 19-99 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 10 1-179 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 180-189 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 190-213 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 214-283 and accompanying text. 
19 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate "[clommerce ... among the 
several States"). 
20 See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmelltal 
Regulation. 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 404 (2005) (stating that, " ... when the various environmental 
statutes were adopted, the underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause 'grants virtually 
carte blanche authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection'''). 
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though they lack significant commercial value.21 Though views of the 
environment have changed, the Commerce Clause remains the primary 
avenue to pass laws both to exploit and preserve the environment. 
The Supreme Court decisions that define the scope of the 
Commerce Clause represent three distinct eras.22 Over time, the 
composition of the Supreme Court has affected the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, first expanding it, then constricting it, then expanding 
it again. This pattern of giving and taking power away from Congress is 
the product of changing times and changing Courts. Throughout these 
changes, the line of jurisprudence remains intact, the Court rarely 
overruling precedent. Therefore the current analytical framework that 
the Roberts Court is faced with constitutes both a compromise of 
authority and a contradiction of opinions. 
A 1941 Supreme Court case involving a farmer's intrastate 
production of wheat, Wickard v. Filburn,23 represents the high-water 
mark in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme Court 
determined that in deciding whether an activity substantially affected 
interstate commerce, intrastate economic activity could be viewed in the 
aggregate. 24 This is known as Wickard's "aggregate effects test" 
whereby the judiciary can analyze the cumulative effects of otherwise de 
minimus economic activities to ascertain whether, when aggregated, 
these activities exert a substantial effect on interstate commerce.25 Those 
who wish to expand the Commerce Clause's power to regulate certain 
activity rely heavily on Wickard.26 
Two other cases narrow the scope of the Commerce Clause by 
developing a three-prong analysis that centers on an activity's connection 
to interstate commerce.27 In addressing the constitutionality of the Gun 
Free School Zones Act,28 the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Lopez identified 
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its 
commerce power. 29 Congress can regulate the use of channels of 
21 Mank, supra note 8, at 924·925. 
22 The historical eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence are often represented 
chronologically: cases before 1937, cases from 1937-1995, and cases after 1995. These eras 
coincide with landmark Supreme Court cases. ERWIN CHEMERlNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES. 238-268 (2d ed. 2002). 
23 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114-115 (1942). 
24 Id. at 127-128. 
25 Id.; Mank, supra note 8, at 946. 
26 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005) ("Our decision in Wickard is of particular 
relevance"). 
27 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 
28 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990) (Gun Free School Zones Act of \990). 
29 Lopez 514 U.S. at 558-559. 
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interstate commerce; Congress can regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of commerce; and Congress can regulate those activities 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.30 Lopez interpreted 
this last power to include those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.31 Later in U.S. v. Morrison, the Court addressed a 
facial attack on the Violence Against Women Ace2 that provided a civil 
remedy for victims of gender motivated crimes.33 In both cases, the 
Supreme Court held that the challenged laws dealt with non-economic 
activities that should be regulated by the states, as they traditionally have 
been.34 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided a case based largely on 
Wickard's large grant of power.35 Gonzales v. Raich made a bold return 
to Wickard's principles by aggregating the effects of home-grown, 
intrastate medical marijuana for the purpose of proving a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.36 In applying Wickard to Raich, the Court 
concluded that there were striking factual similarities between the two.3? 
The Supreme Court determined that, as in Wickard, "leaving home-
consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price 
and market conditions.,,38 As the Supreme Court held in Wickard, the 
Raich Court found that the aggregate effect of not regulating intrastate 
marijuana would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by 
rendering the comprehensive scheme of the Controlled Substances Ace9 
("CSA") ineffective.40 In describing the applicability of the 
comprehensive scheme rationale to the CSA, the majority concluded that 
the CSA is an economic regulatory scheme, and regulating intrastate 
marijuana is an essential part of that scheme.41 
Raich applied the economic requirement, using Lopez and Morrison 
as guidelines, but eventually distinguished those cases from the CSA on 
the basis of what constituted "economic activity.,,42 The Supreme Court 
30 1d. 
31 1d. 
32 42 U.S.c. § 13981 (Violence Against Women Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598. 
33 /d. at 602. 
34 Id. at 615-616; Lopez. 514 U.S. at 560. 
35 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209. 
36/d. at 2209, 2211 (using Wickard's aggregation principles in addition to using Lopez and 
Morrison's narrow definition of "economic"). 
37 Id. at 2206-2207. 
38 1d. 
39 21 U.S.C. § 841. et. seq. (Controlled Substances Act). 
40 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2209,2215. 
41 Id. at 2208-2209. 
42/d. at 221 \. 
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in Raich cautioned that Lopez and Morrison cannot be read too broadly.43 
Many argue it is in this way that Lopez and Morrison left the Commerce 
Clause blurred in distinctions based on undefined terms and ambiguous 
language.44 
The ambiguous Commerce Clause framework of Lopez and 
Morrison has plagued intrastate wetland protection as well. Until 2001, 
intrastate wetlands protections were strong; then, Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers ("SW ANCC") 
signaled a changing trend in intrastate protections and may signal what 
could be the beginning of the Supreme Court's movement towards 
limiting the protections of environmentallaws.46 Since there are many 
parallels between intrastate wetlands and intrastate species protections, 
many view the Supreme Court decision to strip intrastate wetlands from 
federal protection as a relevant indicator of the future of the ESA.47 The 
SWANCC Court did not extend Clean Water Act jurisdiction to wetlands 
that did not have a hydrological connection and were not adjacent to a 
navigable waterway.48 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
stated in dicta that because migratory birds utilize isolated wetlands, this 
does not bring those wetlands into the realm of affecting interstate 
commerce.49 
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on three cases 
involving intrastate wetlands.50 U.S. v. Rapanos and Carabell v. U.S. 
Anny Corps of Engineers involve statutory jurisdiction issues similar to 
SWANCC, and when decided, will be relevant indicators of how the ESA 
might be treated in the Supreme Court.51 In both cases, landowners 
sought to discharge fill material into intrastate wetlands and challenged 
the Corps' statutory authority to regulate those parcels under the Clean 
43 [d. at 2209. 
44 See Blumm. supra note 8, at 493. 
45 See Mank, supra note 8, at 958-959 (stating that the dicta in SWANCC mirrors the 
federalism concerns expressed in Lopez and Morrison). 
46 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
47 See Mank, supra note 8, at 958-959 (stating that the dicta in SWANCC mirrors the 
federalism concerns expressed in Lopez and Morrison). 
48 SWANCC. 531 U.S. at 174. 
49 [d. at 173. 
50 Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), eert. granted, 126 
S.Ct. 414 (Oct. 11,2005) (No. 04-1384); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), 
eert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 414 (Oct. 11,2005) (No. 04-1034); S.D. Warren County v. Bd. of Envtl. 
Prot., 868 A. 2d 210 (2005), een. granted, 126 S.Ct. 414 (2005) (No. 04-1527). 
51 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 634-635; Carabell, 391 F.3d at 707; S.D. Warren County v. Bd. of 
Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d at 214-217 (involving a Clean Water Act Section 40 I state certification, not a 
jurisdictional case). 
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Water Act ("CWA,,).52 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
in each case, affirmed the lower court's decisions, applying SWANCC in 
favor of the government.53 Appeals to both were granted certiorari on 
October 11, 2005.54 The outcome of those cases could either reaffirm 
SWANCC's application of the Commerce Clause to intrastate entities, or 
it could pave a new direction in intrastate wetlands protection, further 
threatening the ESA. 
B. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The ESA is arguably the most aggressive environmental law of its 
time.55 Critics of the ESA focus on the statute's expansive nature and 
unsympathetic view towards property owners and developers. 56 For 
example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, ("TV A"), a large dam 
project was halted after it was 70-80% complete because of the existence 
of the small, endangered fish, the snail darter.57 The district court found 
that "some $53 million would be lost in non-recoverable obligations.,,58 
Despite the cost, the Court refused to put a price tag on the existence of 
the snail darter, or on any other endangered species, no matter how 
important or unimportant it may appear to be. 
The powerful nature of the ESA has also made it an appropriate 
target for recent attempts to weaken its provisions. 59 In September of 
2005, Congressman Richard Pombo of California introduced a bill in the 
House of Representatives that would substantially weaken the ESA's 
critical habitat provision, and offer a generous compensation scheme to 
land owners who find themselves "victims" of the ESA.60 So while the 
ESA remains a powerful protection, one might wonder if changing times 
52 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632-633, 635-644; Carabello 391 F.3d at 705-708. 
53 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 648; Carabello 391 F.3d at 710. 
54 See supra note 50. 
55 See e.g .. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) ("T.V.A.") (halting a dam 
construction project to preserve the habitat of the snail darter, a small fish). 
56 See John T. Winemiller, The Endangered Species Act and the Imprecise Scope of the 
Substantial Effects Analysis, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 159,198 (2004). 
57 TVA, 437 U.S. at 195. 
58 Id. at 166. 
59 "Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005", H.R. 3824, I09th Congo 
(2005). 
60 /d.; See generally Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in Congress: From Consensus 
to Gridlock. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4th ed. 136 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 
Congressional Quarterly 2000). (In 1995, California Rep. Pombo and Alaska Rep. Young 
introduced a Bill that would have weakened the ESA's provisions by considering the special 
interests of property owners and the economic impacts that the ESA has on landowners and 
developers. The 104th Congress never approved a final bill.) Id. 
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are creating new opportunities for the Act's adversaries. 
Most of the ESA litigation discussed in this Comment focuses on 
the constitutionality of Section 9, as applied to intrastate species.6l 
Section 9 of the ESA protects critical habitats against modification or 
destruction by preventing the "taking" of a listed species.62 Therefore, 
Section 9 of the ESA is often referred to as the "take" provision. To 
"take" a species, by statutory definition, is "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct.,,63 Additionally, the majority of the ESA cases discussed 
in this Comment are circuit court cases.64 While the Supreme Court has 
never decided the constitutionality of the "take provision" as applied to 
intrastate species, the ESA has withstood several constitutional 
challenges at the circuit court level.65 Each circuit's analysis hinges on 
different rationales, which has resulted in splintered reasoning among the 
circuits. 66 
For example, in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbit67 
("NAHB"), the D.C. Circuit held that Congress could regulate the taking 
of an intrastate species under the Commerce Clause based on four 
different rationales in the main opinion alone.68 At the time, the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly was located only in California, after urban 
development, trash dumping and off-road vehicle use eliminated over 97 
percent of its historic habitat.69 The proposed development project 
would have taken a portion of the fly's remaining habitat, contrary to the 
ESA's prohibitions.70 The developer brought a constitutional challenge 
and the district court ultimately held that the application of the ESA's 
"take" provision to the fly was constitutional.7l 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, focusing on the "substantial effects" 
prong of Lopez.72 It found under Wickard's aggregation principle, the 
taking of the fly viewed in the aggregate of all other intrastate 
endangered species takes, would substantially affect interstate 
61 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973). 
62 [d. 
63 /d. at § 1532. 
64 See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text. 
65/d. 
66 See Adler, supra note 20, at 406; see also 8lumm, supra note 8, at 327; see also Scopp, 
supra note 8, at 803-810; see also Winemiller, supra note 56, at 179-187. 
67 NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041. 
68 [d. at 1057. 
69 [d. at 1044. 
70 [d. at 1044-1045. 
71 [d. at 1045. 
72 [d. at 1049-1057. 
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commerce.
73 The court based this finding on the "option value" of 
biodiversity, i.e., that species might hold some undiscovered potential 
medicinal or scientific value.74 
Three years later, a case emerged from the Fourth Circuit, the 
outcome of which was the same as NAHB, but was based on the direct 
economic nature of the species rather than a reliance on biodiversity.75 
Gibbs v. Babbitt ("Gibbs") involved the taking of the red wolf.76 Like 
NAHB, the Gibbs court focused on Lopez's substantial-effects prong.77 
Since Lopez identifies this prong as requiring some sort of economic 
endeavor in order to be fulfilled,78 the Gibbs court asked "whether the 
taking of red wolves on private land is in any sense of the phrase 
economic activity," and answered in the affirmative.79 
According to Gibbs, the judiciary must take a broad view of 
economic activity or commerce.80 Gibbs found that the taking of the 
wolves was economic for two main reasons. First, the protection of 
economic and commercial assets was the primary motivation for taking 
the wolves.8! Second, a direct relationship exists between wolves and 
commerce: "[ w lith no red wolves, there would be no-red-wolf related 
tourism, no scientific research, and no commercial trade in pelts.,,82 
Wolves are "incubators for commerce in the same way that parks and 
public waters generate commercial activity related to their study and 
enjoyment.,,83 The court produced statistics about red-wolf-related 
tourism, claiming that it is an industry projected to generate millions of 
dollars and "result in a significant regional economic impact.,,84 After 
deeming the takings as sufficiently economic, the court then aggregated 
their effects and found that the takings substantially affected interstate 
commerce.85 
The Gibbs court also briefly introduced the concept of a regulatory 
scheme, holding that the ESA is a comprehensive, economic regulatory 
73 ld. at 1046-1047. 
74 1d. at 1052-1053. 
75 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483.493-495 (4th Cir. 2000). 
76 ld. at 488. 
77 ld. at 491. 
78 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
79 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 49l. 
80 1d. at 490. 
81 ld. at 491. 
82 ld. at 492. 
83 See Winemiller, supra note 56, at 180. 
84 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493. 
85 ld. at 498. 
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scheme, and that the take provision is an essential part of it.86 While not 
fully explored in Gibbs, this concept was central to the Fifth Circuit 
decision to follow. 
Another circuit court opinion, GDF Realty Inv. LTD v. Norton 
("GDF"), involving the projected taking of an endangered Cave Species 
Spider, but ultimately relied on the "comprehensive scheme rationale" to 
reaffirm the ESA as constitutional in intrastate species situations.87 The 
court reasoned that the ESA's protections are economic in nature due to 
the incalculable value of genetic heritage.88 In addition, the "ESA is 
truly national in scope," and comprehensive in nature.89 But for the 
regulation of each individual take, the ESA's comprehensive scheme 
would be undercut and would "lead to piece-meal extinctions.,,9o 
GDF rejected the view that the "regulated activity" of the ESA 
should be defined as the action (in this case, it was commercial 
development) that caused the projected takes of the Cave Species.9J 
Three months later, the D.C. Circuit turned its back on GDF and 
embraced that very view in Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, involving the 
taking of the intrastate Southwestern Arroyo Toad.92 The D.C. Circuit 
did not attempt to give the toad economic characteristics. Instead, the 
court reasoned that in a Commerce Clause analysis of the ESA, the 
element that needs to be examined for economic characteristics is not the 
taking of the species or the species themselves, but the activity that is the 
cause of the takes.93 The D.C. Circuit held that ESA regulates those 
"offending activities" that commit the takes, not the takes themselves.94 
Here, the activity that is causing the takes, development, is an economic 
activity and can therefore qualify under the "substantial effects" prong of 
Lopez. 95 The opinion is significant because it represents the first case in 
ESA jurisprudence which bases its entire decision on the rationale of 
redefining the target of the ESA's regulation as the offending activity. 
The D.C. Circuit later denied Rancho Viejo's petition for rehearing 
en banc.96 The two dissenting opinions from Justice Roberts and Justice 
86 Id. at 497. 
87 GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) ("GDF'). 
88 Id. at 639; H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4. 
89 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639. 
90 Id. at 640-641. 
91 Id. at 633-636. 
92 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
93 Id. at 1072. 
94 Id. 
95 /d. at 1070. 
96 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003) reh'g denied. 
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Sentelle reflect concerns that this case represents a divergence of the 
circuit courts from contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence.97 Justice 
Roberts stated in his dissent that only the regulations and laws 
themselves can satisfy the Lopez framework, not the offending activity.98 
He then commented that the "taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of 
its own, lives its entire life in California .... ,,99 Roberts's comment may 
indicate his judicial view against federal regulation for intrastate species, 
one that he may carry with him to his new position as Chief Justice. 
II. ApPL YING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE To THE ESA 
The ESA was passed through the Commerce Clause, which 
regulates interstate commerce and traditionally requires some connection 
to commerce in order to be valid. IOl Species protection is not 
categorically commercial in nature, which has raised concerns about the 
ESA's constitutionality.102 Within the Commerce Clause, the focus on 
commercial activity provoked cases like Lopez and Morrison to rely 
heavily on the commercial/economic requirement in their decisions that 
the Commerce Clause did not apply to non-economic, intrastate 
activities. 103 Recently, Raich applied that precedent in support of federal 
regulation. I04 This Comment contends that Lopez's and Morrison's 
ambiguities contribute to a flawed Commerce Clause framework. 105 In 
addition, this Comment proposes that Raich actually misapplies 
precedent to effectuate an ends-oriented decision. 106 
A. THE FLAWED COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF LOPEZ AND 
MORRISON 
While never formally overruled, the Supreme Court in Lopez pulled 
away from Wickard's large grant of power and limited Congress's 
97 Id. (Sentelle & Roberts 11., dissenting). 
98 /d. (Roberts, 1., dissenting). 
99 1d. 
101 See also Winemiller, supra note 56, at 170-172 (discussing the different interpretations of 
what the Commerce Clause requires). 
102 Daniell. Lowenberg, The Texas Cave Bug and the California Arroyo Toad "Take" on the 
Constitution's Commerce Clause, 36 ST. MARY'S L.l. 149,160 (2004). 
103 See Scopp, supra note 8, at 799. 
104 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2205-2215. 
105 See infra notes 107-140 and accompanying text. 
106 See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text. 
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authority under the Commerce Clause. 107 Many argue that Lopez and 
Morrison represent flawed legal analyses, not because they narrowed the 
scope of the Commerce Clause, but because they did so using ambiguous 
standards that are difficult to apply to future cases.108 Through either the 
Supreme Court's inability or unwillingness to clarify the standards and 
requirements of the Commerce Clause analysis, the current Court is left 
with a flawed framework to decide future cases. This lack of guidance 
leaves the Commerce Clause vulnerable to dangerous interpretations that 
have the capacity to reach outside the scope of current precedent. The 
Court would then have the opportunity to either extend the Commerce 
Clause to situations past that of Wickard or decimate the power of the 
Commerce Clause altogether, as unintended by the Lopez progeny. 
1. Flaw #1: The Amorphous Economic Standard 
One problem with Lopez and its progeny is that the term, 
"economic," has not been consistently defined. 109 Often, cases use 
"economic" interchangeably with "commerce," which is not entirely 
accurate. 110 In Lopez, the Supreme Court does not define what is 
economic. They simply dismiss the certain activities as being non-
economic. lll Despite the fact that it is a pivotal determination in the 
Commerce Clause analysis,112 what is "economic" remains an evolving, 
amorphous standard. ll3 Lopez's and Morrison's economic requirement 
seems to preclude the Commerce Clause from applying to the ESA since 
the ESA protects intrastate subjects that have, arguably, little to no 
economic value. I 14 Controversy remains, however, over whether the 
ESA's effects are economic, and whether these are adequate enough to 
affirm the ESA's constitutionality.ll5 Since Lopez and Morrison provide 
107 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
108 See also Scopp, supra note 8, at 810-814 (discussing the inadequacies of the 
Lopez/Morrison framework in application to the ESA). 
109 Scopp, supra note 8, at 811-812. 
110 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (using "commerce"); See id. at 565 (using "economic 
activity"). 
III [d. at 565.; See Scopp, supra note 8, at 811-812, nn.160 & 165. 
112 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810. 
113 [d.; Mank, supra note 8, at 928, n.30. 
114 Mank, supra note 8, at 924, nn.1O &11. 
115 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493-495 (relying on a rationale where red wolves provide for an 
industry); GDF 326 F.3d at 637,640 (relying on a rationale that each individual take fits into a larger 
regulatory economic scheme of the ESA because the Cave Species spider does not provide such 
industries); NAHB 130 F.3d at 1052-1054 (relying on the potential value of endangered species as 
opposed to actual economic value); See also Mank, supra note 8, at 992, 996-997 (discussing the 
different rationales). 
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little guidance on the issue,116 what the current Court will determine as 
"economic" is difficult to predict. 
2. Flaw #2: The Unstated Object of Regulation 
When analyzing the ESA in a Commerce Clause analysis, the 
ESA's object (or target) of regulation needs to be economic in order to 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce under the Lopez test's 
third prong. ll7 Lopez and Morrison, once again, provide little guidance 
on how to determine what the ESA's object of regulation is. 118 
Some circuit courts viewed the "offending activity" as the object of 
regulation, claiming that the ESA places restrictions on activities that 
would harm an endangered species. 119 Others claim that the ESA is 
regulating the taking of the species, regardless of the nature of the 
activity that is doing the taking. 120 Many speculate on what the ESA is 
truly regulating, and whether or not the object of that regulation is 
economic in nature. l2l While the ESA's constitutionality turns on this 
seemingly simple analysis,122 there are several ways to apply it to the 
ESA based on existing jurisprudence. Lopez, Morrison, Raich and 
Wickard shed some light on what the Supreme Court considers the 
"regulated activity" to be, but do not directly answer these inquiries. 123 
In each case, the challenged statute regulated some intrastate 
activity which the Court then deemed to be economic or non-
economic. 124 In Lopez, Morrison, Wickard and Raich, the regulated 
activities are fairly unambiguous. In Lopez, it was the possession of a 
h d 125 In M ., d . d' 126 In Ul" k d an gun. orTlson, It was gen er-motIvate cnme. yy lC ar , 
it was the marketing of wheat in excess of a quota. 127 And in Raich, it 
116 Scopp, supra note 8, at 811. 
117 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; See also Scopp, supra note 8, at 810-811. 
118 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810. 
119 Rancho Viejo, F.3d at1072; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495. 
120 Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 337. 
121 Mank, supra note 8, at 991-996; Matthews, supra note 8, at 947-948; Scopp, supra note 8, 
at 803-804; Winemiller, supra note 56, at 184-186. 
122 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810. 
123 Winemiller, supra note 56, at 171-175. 
124 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (finding that the intrastate activity was non-economic); Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 613 (finding that the intrastate activity was non-economic); Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211 
(finding that the intrastate activity was economic); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (stating that the 
homegrown wheat is not "commerce," but is intertwined in the economic activity of the wheat 
industry). 
125 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
126 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
127 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. 
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was the cultivation of medical marijuana. 128 While the ESA seems to 
regulate, or prohibit, the taking of listed species, the ESA also places 
controls on the activity that causes the "takes" of those species. 
Deciding what the ESA is truly regulating is an essential step in the 
analysis because it determines what the Court analyzes for economic 
characterl29 for the purpose of aggregating under Wickard. 130 If the 
"regulated activity" of the ESA is found to be the actual taking of the 
species, the Court might not aggregate the effects of those takes due to 
their non-economic nature, because pursuant to Wickard, only economic 
activity may be aggregated. 131 If the "regulated activity" of the ESA is 
the offending activity, the Court will look to this activity to deem 
whether it is economic in nature. Those who advocate the former view, 
that the "regulated activity" is the takes themselves, rely on the plain 
language of the ESA which clearly prohibits "taking" a listed species. 132 
The statute does not prohibit development, grading earth in preparation 
of development, or anything else that might have commercial 
implications.133 The statute plainly prohibits the "taking" of a listed 
species, whatever the motivation. 134 The language in Rancho Viejo, 
Gibbs, and Wickard promotes the latter view, that the "regulated 
activity" is the offending activity. 135 Gibbs discussed that since the 
reasons for taking the red wolves were economically motivated, the takes 
took on an economic nature. 136 In addition to wheat being an agricultural 
commodity, the Wickard Court held that the intrastate cultivation of 
wheat was economically motivated. 137 Wickard discussed how a farmer, 
growing wheat for his personal use on the farm, would be economically 
enticed to distribute that wheat in an interstate market due to rising 
prices. 138 In both cases, the motivation of the takes played a crucial role 
in determining whether or not the activity was economic in character. 
The D.C. Circuit in Rancho Viejo identified the ESA's object of 
128 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2211. 
129 Scopp, supra note 8, at 810 (discussing the importance of "object of regulation" inquiry). 
130 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. finding that though the appellee's activity of growing wheat for 
self-consumption was "commerce," the wheat industry itself was an economic enterprise; /d. at 127-
128 (finding that though minimal, the appellee's acts taken together with others in the same position, 
might exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce). 
131 [d. at 127-128. 
132 Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 337. 
133 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973). 
134 [d. 
135 See infra notes 136-140. 
136 Gibbs, 214 F.3d. at 492, 495. 
137 Wickard. 317 U.S. at 128. 
138 [d. 
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regulation as the offending activity.139 The majority stated that "[t]he 
ESA does not purport to tell toads what they mayor may not do. Rather, 
Section 9 limits the taking of listed species, and its prohibitions and 
corresponding penalties apply to the persons who do the taking, not to 
the species that are taken.,,140 Rancho Viejo marks the first time this 
rationale was used as the primary basis for affirming the ESA's 
constitutionality, but the issue still remains blurred at the Supreme Court 
level. The statutes in Lopez, Morrison, Wickard and Raich do not lend 
themselves to a smooth application to the ESA and make it difficult to 
understand the full effect of those decisions. 
B. RAICH' s MrSAPPLICA TION OF PRECEDENT 
Based on Lopez and Morrison, we know that handgun-possession 
crimes and gender-motivated crimes do not fit into the Commerce 
Clause,141 but we have only a vague vision of what does. In addition, the 
exact legal effect of Wickard remained untested until the Supreme Court 
decided Raich, which extended Commerce Clause authority to the 
federal regulation of intrastate production, distribution and consumption 
of medical marijuana. 142 
1. Raich Misapplies Wickard 
While the majority opinion cited the analytical framework of Lopez 
and Morrison to support its decision, the Raich Court also relied upon 
the early case of Wickard in a lengthy factual and legal comparison. 143 
Those looking not to expand the scope of the Commerce Clause, 
however, could find many considerable differences between Raich and 
Wickard. 
When the Court looked at the similarities between Wickard and 
Raich, it discussed how the intrastate production of each commodity 
139 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at \072. 
140 1d. 
141 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
142 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215. 
143 The Supreme Court in Wickard held that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the 
authority to regulate intrastate production and consumption of wheat. The Court stated that the 
aggregate effects of one man's production of wheat would affect the interstate market of that 
commodity, and therefore can be regulated (Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-129). While Wickard was 
never explicitly overruled, the subsequent line of Commerce Clause cases that came nearly 60 years 
after Wickard, including Lopez and Morrison, receded from Wickard's broad grant of authority. 
Lopez and Morrison restrained the scope of the Commerce Clause without overruling Wickard (See 
Mank, supra note 8, at 955). 
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could easily be pulled or enticed into the interstate market because of 
economic motivations, creating a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.
l44 Several aspects are wrong with Raich' s application of 
Wickard in this instance. 
First, Raich is unclear about the nature or size of the market that 
will be affected by this conversion of intrastate commodities to interstate 
commodities. 145 The Court in Raich states that Americans pay 10.5 
billion dollars a year for marijuana, however, the Court does not indicate 
whether this revenue is for medical or recreational use. 146 The Court 
ignores the distinction between the two markets, and ignores the 
considerable differences between the twO. 147 Wickard was concerned 
with the economic effect that unchecked production of intrastate wheat 
would have on the interstate wheat market. 148 Raich attempts to parallel 
its case to Wickard by claiming that the unchecked cultivation of 
intrastate marijuana would substantially affect the interstate market for 
it. 149 The cultivation and consumption of medical marijuana would not 
likely substantially affect the interstate commerce of the marijuana 
market in the same way as the cultivation and consumption of wheat in 
the 1930s affected the interstate wheat market. Wheat can be legally 
grown by any landowner, whereas medical marijuana can only be legally 
grown by those permitted to do so based on their medical requirements. 
One would logically reason that the quantity of marijuana being pulled 
into the interstate market is much smaller than the potential quantity of 
wheat being pulled into the interstate market, simply based on those 
authorized to grow the crop. 150 Therefore, one must conclude that adding 
a limited intrastate market for medical marijuana would not substantially 
affect interstate commerce to the same extent as in Wickard. 
Raich claims that the introduction of intrastate medical marijuana 
into the interstate market might leave a "gaping hole" in the CSA. 151 
However, the intrastate market would be limited by the potential patients 
for whom marijuana was recommended. So, the introduction of this 
limited quantity of medical marijuana into the interstate market might not 
leave such a "gaping hole" in the CSA's regulatory scheme as Raich had 
predicted due to the limited potential pool of people bringing that good 
144 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2206-2207. 
145 See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
146 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2208, n.31. 
147 [d. at 2208. 
148 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-129. 
149 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2207. 
150 However, this does not take into account those who grow marijuana illegally. 
151 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2209. 
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from the intrastate to the interstate market. 152 The ability to predict the 
actual effect of deregulation was clear in Wickard, where the Court cited 
substantial findings of this nature. 153 Raich cited no findings as to the 
actual effect of this deregulation to the degree of certainty that Wickard 
. 154 
appears to reqUire. 
Second, the differences in the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
("AAA") and the CSA are too great to be overlooked. The main purpose 
of the AAA was price protection of the agricultural industry.155 The 
CSA prohibited all marijuana cultivation and possession except in 
limited circumstances,156 which appears to parallel closer to controlling 
behavior and crime as opposed to regulating market forces. Therefore, 
any in-depth comparison of the two statutes is stunted due to their 
divergent purposes. 
In addition, as an underlying policy consideration, the Court should 
not recognize an illegal, recreational market for marijuana in making 
decisions about its legal use. In assuming that a thriving illegal market 
for marijuana exists, the Court is basing the legality of a useful medical 
drug on the prospective criminal activity arising from that illegal 
market. 157 
While proponents of the ESA currently focus on the legal arguments 
in applying Raich broadly to the ESA,158 the primary focus should be on 
the consequences in doing so. The Supreme Court expanded the scope 
of the Commerce Clause past that of Wickard in an attempt to obtain the 
desired holding to regulate a widely abused drug. 159 The Supreme Court 
might find considerable differences between the CSA and the ESA and 
perhaps not interpret Raich to be applicable to the latter. 
2. Raich Misapplies Lopez and Morrison 
Raich distinguishes itself from both Lopez and Morrison by 
distinguishing between the economic or non economic character of the 
activities at issue. 160 Raich states that the non-economic nature of 
152 Id. 
153 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-129. 
154 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2226-2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
155 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115. 
156 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2204 (classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, which has no 
legitimate uses and is flatly prohibited by the CSA except for limited scientific purposes). 
157 Id. at 2212. As a policy consideration, the Court should not assume that an illegal market 
in marijuana will continue to thrive post-CSA. 
158 Blumm, supra note 8, at 493-497. 
159 See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text. 
160 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2211. 
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handgun possession and gender-motivated violence weighed heavily on 
the Court's decision to invalidate the statutes in Lopez and Morrison. 161 
Unlike the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, Raich concludes that 
the Controlled Substances Act governs "quintessentially economic 
activities," "economic" referring to the "production, distribution and 
consumption of commodities.,,'62 So even though Raich actually 
criminalizes behavior as does Lopez, for example, the Court in Raich 
makes a distinction based on the shallow premise that controlled 
substances can be "consumed" in the traditional sense of being taken in 
by the body, which makes them more of an economic commodity.'63 
This is an arbitrary distinction because "consumption" has a broader 
meaning as well, which encompasses the general "use" of a good. The 
Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez governed the "use" or 
"consumption" of handguns, but was not considered "economic" based 
on that premise. 164 
While the CSA mayor may not have been regulating truly 
economic activity, Lopez and Morrison provided little guidance on how 
to define the term, "economic", which has led to the arbitrary distinctions 
in Raich and will continue to cause confusion and inconsistency in Court 
opinions until the ambiguity is resolved. 165 
C. SWANCC, FEDERALISM, AND THE ESA 
Intrastate species protections encounter similar legal roadblocks as 
intrastate wetland protections, and they might be headed for a similar fate 
at the Supreme Court level. Until 2001, intrastate wetlands were 
protected under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Then SWANCC, in 
which a constitutional limitation was included in the language of the 
opinion, rejected the argument that isolated wetlands should be included 
in the CWA's protections. 166 In SWANCC, the Court discusses concerns 
of federalism, and infringement on state sovereignty in cases that present 
federal law attempts to regulate intrastate matters. 167 While SWANCC's 
holding is limited to statutory interpretation under the CW A and was not 
161 [d. at 2209-2210. 
162 [d. at 221J. 
163 [d. 
164 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
165 Scopp, supra note 8, at 799-802. 
166 While not decided on Commerce Clause grounds, the Supreme Court did include in its 
dicta its stance on the limitations of the Clean Water Act to include isolated wetlands and vernal 
pools. SWANCC. 531 U.S. at 174. 
167 [d. 
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decided under the Commerce Clause,168 the two concepts are inextricably 
related in this situation. The discussion of federalism concerns by the 
majority in SWANCC easily translates into similar concerns of the ESA 
infringing on states' rights under the Commerce Clause. 169 In both cases, 
a federal statute dictates what a state must do with its own land resources 
in regards to wetlands or to critical habitats. Despite this seemingly 
striking similarity, there are also several distinctions between wetland 
protections and endangered species protections. 170 
One distinction between the two is the possible difference in the 
target of the statute's protections. Wetlands, under the CWA are 
regulated as part of the geography of the land. 17I Endangered species 
and critical habitats designated pursuant to the ESA are regulated as a 
means to protect the species themselves.172 Wetlands protections under 
the CW A are essentially a land regulation with the indirect protection of 
living creatures that the wetlands support, whereas species protections 
under the ESA are direct protections of those living creatures. 173 This 
distinction is also relevant as a states' rights issue. Land regulation is an 
area of traditional state control 174 and is less likely to be relinquished to 
the federal government than the regulation of li ving creatures that are not 
technically part of the land. 
Another distinction turns on the effects of the resources that the 
168 SWANCC, though dealing with statutory interpretation, id., provides insight as to what that 
Court would argue had it involved Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The majority held that intrastate, 
isolated wetlands are not "navigable waters," and therefore, not covered by the Clean Water Act, 
which can only assert statutory jurisdiction over navigable waters. This is significant for two 
reasons. First, the decision shows that the Court interprets "navigable waters" narrowly, through its 
plain meaning, as waters capable of being used for navigation. Therefore, had this case involved 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction, the Court would have most likely found that these sorts of wetlands 
cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause because they do not fall within the traditional, plain 
meaning of the word, commerce. Second, the decision turns on whether these wetlands had a 
hydrological connection to a navigable waterway. Since they did not, they were not held to be 
navigable waterways. Had the Court found a hydrological nexus between the wetlands and a 
navigable waterway, the outcome might have been different. Therefore, the scope of this decision is 
unknown because it is factually-driven, determinative upon the finding of a hydrological connection. 
[d.; Cf United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (finding a 
hydrological nexus). 
169 Blumm, supra note 8, at 325-326; Winemiller, supra note 56, at 187-189. 
170 See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text. 
171 33 U.S.c. § 1344 (1972). 
172 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973). 
173 However, this is a technical distinction and could be easily dismissed by a judge who 
believes that in protecting the nation's waters, Congress also meant to protect the biodiversity that 
exists in those waters. 
174 Matthew B. Baumgartner, SWANCC's Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress's 
Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2158-2159 
(2005). 
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CW A and the ESA protect and if they are widespread enough to be 
considered "national" as opposed to "intrastate.,,175 Protecting 
endangered species is an integral step in preserving biodiversity.176 
Though the existence of intrastate species is local, the benefits of 
biodiversity are felt nationwide (and worldwide).177 Wetlands offer 
buffering and filtering of precipitation, minerals, and chemicals.178 They 
provide flood control and are habitats for a significant number of plants 
and animals. 179 While all of these are important and valuable functions, 
their immediate effects are generally local. In the case of an intrastate 
wetland that has no hydrological connection to any navigable waterway 
(besides the connection created by the broad argument that all the 
nation's waters are connected, no matter how distant they are from one 
another), the benefits of that wetlands functions are most likely felt 
locally. 
m. How LONG WILL THE ESA's CONSTITUTIONALITY REMAIN 
UNDECIDED? 
The Supreme Court has not affirmed the ESA's constitutionality. 
This may be because of a reluctance to detract from the legislative intent 
behind the ESA. The ESA is not only a powerful law but a powerful 
message that the preservation of biodiversity is an important value to the 
public and to the government that represents the public's interests. 
However, considering the following facts, it might be only a matter of 
time before the new Roberts Court decides that the Commerce Clause 
cannot support provisions of the ESA or the ESA in its entirety. 
A. CIRCUIT COURTS' SPLINTERED RATIONALE 
One reason the Supreme Court might grant certiorari in a near-
future ESA constitutionality case is to decide an unsettled issue of law. 
The circuit court cases of NAHB, Gibbs, GDF and Rancho Viejo all 
affirmed the ESA was constitutional as applied to intrastate species,180 
m Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-618 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568) (''The Constitution requires 
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local .... "). 
176 NAHB, l30 F.3d at 1052. 
177 [d. at 1052 n.ll. 
178 Carey Schmidt, Private Wetlands and Public Values: "Navigable Waters" and the 
Significant Nexus Test Under the Clean Water Act, 26 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 97-98 
(2005). 
179/d. 
180 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506; GDF, 326 F.3d at 641; Rancho Viejo, 
323 F.3d at 1071. 
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but did so using very different rationales. 181 While the unified outcome 
makes a strong statement in favor of the ESA's constitutionality, the 
differences in the rationales undermine the stability of the holdings. 182 
Though GDF points out the differing viewpoints among NAHB, 
Gibbs and itself,183 it claims it is consistent with these cases as well as 
current Commerce Clause precedent. 184 However, GDF rejects the 
rationale that Rancho Viejo accepts in its opinion four months later. 18S 
This splintered decision-making weakens these circuit court decisions 
and makes for precarious precedent. The court system is built on 
principles of predictability, precedent, and consistency, but these circuit 
court decisions rely on a plethora of justifications. So while they all 
claim the ESA is constitutional, they are not in agreement as to why it is 
constitutional. The Supreme Court might recognize the need to decide 
for itself which rationale, if any, is correct. 
B. WETLANDS AND ENDANGERED SPECIES 
In many ways, wetland protection under the CW A paralleled 
endangered species protections under the ESA up until 2001 when 
SWANCC was decided. 186 Some would even consider intrastate wetlands 
decisions at the Supreme Court level as good predictors of how the Court 
might treat future intrastate ESA cases. 187 Currently, two of the three 
wetlands cases that were granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on 
October 11, 2005, involved statutory jurisdictional issues in the same 
vein as SWANCc. 188 Both cases arose from the Sixth Circuit, and in both 
cases, the courts issued favorable decisions for the federal government, 
allowing it to assert jurisdiction over intrastate wetlands. 189 One might 
speculate as to what exactly prompted the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari over these cases at this time and whether the ESA is next on the 
docket. 
Ultimately, granting certiorari signals that some aspect of those 
181 See generally, Mank, supra note 8. 
182 Paul Ziel, Interstate Commerce and Intrastate Endangered Species: The Controversy and 
the Need/or Compromise, 20 BYU 1. PUB. L. 167, 184-185 (2005) (discussing how Rancho Viejo 
undermines the stability of GDFj. 
183 GDF, 326 F.3d at 635-637. 
184 1d. at 635. 
185 Matthews, supra note 8, at 947. 
186 See generally Adler, supra note 20 (discussing similar Constitutional issues encountered 
by wetlands protection and endangered species protection). 
187 See generally Adler, supra note 20. 
188 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
189 1d. 
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cases, or of that area of law was not being dealt with correctly by the 
circuit courts. The Supreme Court might look at the ESA in the same 
way. Granting certiorari in Rapanos and Carabell may signal the 
Supreme Court's potential pursuit of more clarity in environmental 
jurisdiction. 
IV. THE ESA'S LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
If the Supreme Court decides to review the ESA's constitutionality, 
several factors threaten the Act's likelihood of success. 190 Though the 
Court is bound by precedent, individual beliefs inevitably tend to 
maneuver their way into any given justice's decision. This Comment 
proposes that Raich was a product of judicial activism. 191 In addition, 
this Comment speculates that judicial activism may work against 
environmental laws in the long run. 192 
A. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE ESA 
Judicial activism193 permeates the court system and has both 
positive and negative impacts. On one hand, judicial activism allows the 
Court to analyze the Constitution as an evolving document. Changes in 
everything from social viewpoints to ideas of equity and fairness require 
the Court to analyze the Constitution flexibly and make it applicable to 
current situations. It is in this way that the Court ended segregation in 
schools, provided for a woman's right of reproductive bodily autonomy, 
and interpreted the Bill of Rights as including within its penumbra a right 
to privacy.194 On the other hand, judicial activism includes instances 
where judges impose their own views into case opinions. Impartiality is 
required of all judges, but preconceived notions of a fair outcome, bias, 
and political pressure are all difficult to overlook. Occasionally a judge 
190 See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text. 
191 See infra notes 193-20 I and accompanying text. 
192 [d. 
193 Judicial activism is a phenomenon used to describe justices who do not construe the words 
of statutes and the Constitution closely to their plain meaning if there are circumstances that require 
them to interpret the meaning to adapt to those circumstances. In general, judicial activism has a 
negative connotation because it creates less predictability in Court decisions and might reflect 
personal biases. However, though most judicial liberals are looked at as more activist than judicial 
conservatives, this Comment contends that it may be present at both ends of the political spectrum. 
See Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court. 9 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005) (discussing the dichotomy of judicial conservatives). 
194 See Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ordering the end to racial segregation in 
public schools); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion); See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing a right to privacy). 
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will make an "ends oriented" decision, meaning that he or she decides 
what the outcome should be, then finds ways to rationalize it in an 
opInIon. The benefits of judicial activism have advanced the 
environmental movement, just as the disadvantages of judicial activism 
have proved detrimental. 
As applied to the ESA, the effects of judicial activism could be 
determinative at the Supreme Court level. This Comment contends that 
Raich was a product of j~dicial activism within the Supreme Court. 195 
Many agree that "while the Raich majority purports to be following the 
doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a 
repudiation of th[o]se prior cases."I96 In addition, many factual and legal 
differences exist between Raich and Wickard and should have been 
distinguished further in the Raich opinion. 197 Raich 's outcome was 
partially based on the subject matter of the case. The federal government 
took a stand on the "war on drugs" and Raich represents immense 
support from the judiciary for that crusade. 198 If the Court were faced 
with the ESA rather than the CSA, it might not have reached the same 
conclusion so readily. The ESA does not regulate the health and safety 
of the public to the extent of the CSA. 199 In addition, the ESA has 
formidable opponents with deep pockets, tenth amendment concerns, and 
promises to revive economically depressed regions with new 
development. These differences might matter to an activist jUdiciary. As 
long as activism is present in the court system, the legal status of 
environmental laws like the ESA will never be certain or safe. 
On the other hand, judicial activism could also help the ESA 
succeed at the Supreme Court level if the Court recognizes that the 
Commerce Clause should evolve as changing circumstances require. 
Gibbs stated that commerce should not be confined to its 18th century 
form. 20o Many could argue that this statement directly expands the role 
of the Commerce Clause into supporting environmental laws that are not 
traditionally commercial. The danger in this interpretation would be the 
broad overuse of the Commerce Clause, which would upset many who 
believe that the original intent of the Clause was to provide for regulation 
of interstate commerce in the more traditional sense. 
195 See supra notes 193-194; see infra notes 196-20 I and accompanying text. 
196 See generally Jonathan Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) 
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005). 
197 See supra notes 143-159 and accompanying text. 
198 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2202. 
199 The CSA regulates controlled substances, which are related to public health. Raich, 125 
S.Ct. at 2203 (stating that the CSA sought to conquer drug abuse). 
200 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491. 
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Either way, judicial activism is present and remains a factor in the 
ESA's likelihood of affirmation at the Supreme Court leve1.201 The 
following subpart explores how the composition of the Court will reveal 
which direction judicial activism will take. 
B. THE ROBERTS COURT 
The Supreme Court's nine justices hold their positions for life, 202 so 
changes in the Court composition are rare, though recently, the Supreme 
Court has undergone four significant changes. With the addition of 
Justices Roberts and Alito and the loss of Justice O'Connor and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, many speculate as to what interpretive changes in the 
law will ensue?03 
Raich is binding precedent. However, the new Roberts Court would 
likely see weaknesses in applying Raich to the ESA and decide against 
using Raich' s rationale in ESA cases?04 Based on his dissent in Rancho 
Viejo, Justice Roberts appears as if he would likely be a stark opponent 
to reaffirming the ESA's constitutionality concerning intrastate 
components of habitat and species protection.205 Some contend that 
Roberts will be bound by the decision in Raich and will be forced to 
construe the Commerce Clause broadly.206 To counter this argument, 
this Comment cautions that Lopez and Morrison also represent good law 
which narrows the scope of the Commerce Clause?07 In addition, the 
ESA can be distinguished from the CSA in Raich.208 Because of these 
variables, Raich supports the ESA due to its reading of Commerce 
Clause authority, however it cannot be solely (or firmly) relied upon in 
the Roberts Court. Roberts' jurisprudence suggests that he provides a 
"willingness to closely scrutinize acts of Congress to ensure they are a 
201 Though judicial activism and judicial conservatism are seen as opposites, many judicial 
conservatives still maintain an activist role by deciding cases in part by the subject matter of the 
case. 
202 But See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five 
Takes. 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 922 (2005) (rejecting a proposal that Supreme Court 
justices be elected for a single 18 year term as opposed to their current lifetime term). 
203 See generally Adler, supra note 196, (analyzing Justice Kennedy and his versatile role on 
the Supreme Court); See also Jeff Bleich, Michelle Friedland & Daniel Powell, The New Chief 66-
NOV OR. ST. B. BULL. 18 (2005) (discussing Justice Roberts' role as the new Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court). 
204 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
205 Bleich, supra note 203, at 23. 
206 Blumm, supra note 8, at 498; Ziel, supra note 182, at 185. 
207 Lopez and Morrison were not overruled by Raich and remain binding precedent; See 
generally Adler, supra note 196 (discussing the effect Raich will have on Morrison). 
208 See supra notes 143-149 and accompanying text. 
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proper exercise of the Commerce power.,,209 
In addition to Justice Roberts, several other variables exist within 
the current composition of the Supreme Court. Justices Scalia and 
Thomas are threats to the ESA mainly because of their strict 
constructionist views of Constitutional and statutory interpretation.2lO 
Furthermore, newly confirmed Justice Alito is also labeled a strict 
constructionist, which has earned him the moniker, "Scalito," meaning 
"Little Scalia.,,211 Justice Alito replaces Justice O'Connor, who was the 
deciding vote in many crucial social justice cases.212 Her retirement 
removed a neutral middleman justice from the Supreme Court.213 These 
changes in Supreme Court composition mayor may not be determinative 
in an ESA case. Unfortunately, many of the changes indicate that if the 
new members of the Court make any impact at all, it will not favor the 
ESA. 
V. THREE PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
This Comment explored the likelihood of the ESA's "take" 
provision being upheld by the Supreme Court, and came to the 
disheartening conclusion that the likelihood is slim.214 Three plausible 
solutions exist within the states, the legislature, and the Supreme Court. 
A. FEDERALISM: EXCLUSIVE STATE AUTHORITY 
Some environmental laws incorporate aspects of cooperative 
federalism into their provisions.215 However, the arguments for giving 
exclusive authority to the states to protect intrastate species and critical 
habitats are weak. This subpart of the Comment explores the benefits 
209 Bleich, supra note 203 at 23. 
210 See generally, Claeys, supra note 193. 
211 Shannon P. Duffy, LAW.COM The Mild-Mannered Scalia, Feb. II, 2006, 
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=I046288236052. 
212 Though Justice O'Connor was a swing vote on many social issues, she was in the majority 
in many cases that limited the scope of Commerce Clause authority (See majority opinions of Lopez, 
Morrison and SWANCC, supra notes 9 & 46). The addition of Alito and Roberts would therefore 
probably not affect the Court's decisions concerning those rules of law. 
213 Her likely "middleman" replacement would be Justice Kennedy; See also Adler, supra 
note 196, at 768-769 (stating that though Kennedy joined the majority in Raich, he is known for his 
strong views on state autonomy). 
214 See supra notes 180-213 and accompanying text. 
215 Cooperative federalism divides responsibilities between federal and state entities by 
allowing the federal government to make "floors," or minimum standards. The states can then create 
more stringent standards more tailored to their individual needs as long as it meets the minimum laid 
out by the federal government. 
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and weaknesses of allowing states to exclusively regulate intrastate 
endangered species. To remedy these weaknesses, some propose giving 
incentives to the states so they will be motivated to promulgate stringent 
protections.216 
While the Supreme Court found in SWANCC that states were best 
equipped to regulate intrastate wetlands exclusively, it does not precisely 
follow that states are best equipped to regulate intrastate endangered 
species exclusively. As stated in Section I, supra, wetlands serve a very 
important ecosystem function of both buffering and filtering rain and 
run-off as well as providing habitats for many plants and animals.217 
They mostly, however, affect only the area or state they are located in 
which make them largely a land use issue, which has traditionally been 
left to the states.218 Biodiversity loss and extinction, even in an intrastate 
species, however, affect more than just the state where the species is 
located. The effects of biodiversity loss cross state lines and reverberate 
through the entire world.219 In addition, many species that are now only 
located within one state, once had an interstate population that crossed 
borders and would probably have fallen under the Commerce Clause, 
such as in Gibbs with the red wolf population,z2o Ironically, some of 
these species might not be able to remain under the ESA's protection 
because we neglected to safeguard them before their populations became 
so small that they became confined within a single state. 
Many argue that federal jurisdiction over intrastate endangered 
species serves to prevent a "race to the bottom.,,221 Allowing states to set 
their own environmental standards leaves intrastate resources vulnerable 
to deregulation in an attempt to attract industry and business to that state. 
216 See Winemiller, supra note 56, at 198-199 (suggesting compensating developers by 
offering them tax credits and subsidies when they encounter situations where they own land where 
endangered species are found to exist). However, this article contends that motivating states to 
enact more stringent protections for endangered species and critical habitats strikes the correct 
balance between allowing states to distribute compensation how they see fit as opposed to directly 
overcompensating developers for simply complying with the ESA. States may choose to 
compensate landowners and developers in this way, but giving states the responsibility to disperse 
the funds preserves ideals of state autonomy while still ensuring better environmental protections, all 
the while bypassing a Commerce Clause conflict. 
217 Schmidt, supra note 178, at 97-99. 
218 Mank, supra note 8, at 959. 
219 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052 (supporting the theory that preserving any given intrastate species 
would benefit not only the single state in which the species is located, but would contribute to the 
ultimate benefits of genetic variation and species diversity conservation). 
220 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488. 
221 The phrase, "race to the bottom" is used to describe situations where states promote 
relaxed standards in order to attract more business and industry. A competition begins between 
states to see which can lower their standards the most in order to profit economically. 
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This is especially dangerous in the case of biodiversity loss where the 
distribution of endangered species is not uniform throughout the country 
and where some states hold a large share of these species. However, as 
mentioned supra, states can be prompted to implement more stringent 
regulations of their own through the use of economic incentives.222 If 
states are compensated for the loss of development due to the large 
presence of endangered species within their borders, then the race to the 
bottom might not be an issue. However, one cannot overlook the 
argument that giving states exclusive authority to regulate the "takings" 
of intrastate endangered species would be to strip the federal government 
of the power to prevent biodiversity loss. This would have global 
repercussions. 
B. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
In certain cases, legislative solutions might be the only remaining 
option for some aspects of environmental law. This Comment contends 
that the ESA is in need of a legislative solution which will eventually 
lead to the correct legal outcome. In addition to providing economic 
incentives in order to motivate states to enact strict regulations, supra, 223 
two other solutions exist within formal legislative processes. 
1. Constitutional Amendment 
The Constitution has been amended for a number of reasons, most 
all of which were to advance the social and legal evolution of this 
country.224 While amending the Constitution could take a long time and 
could prove to be ineffective against near-future attacks on the ESA, it 
would prove to be the most effective method to ensure stability in the 
court system for environmental laws in the long run. 
If the Commerce Clause was never intended to be used to pass laws 
like the ESA that have intrastate, arguably non-economic properties, then 
perhaps a different authority is needed to ensure full protection of the 
environment. 225 An environmental amendment in the US Constitution 
222 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
224 U.S. CONST. amend. Xli (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting suffrage 
to all races); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX am (granting suffrage to women). 
225 Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215-2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the CSA be upheld 
through the Necessary and Proper Clause); See also Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A 
Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Presen'e, Protect, and Promote the 
Environment, 32 Ecology L. Q. 821, 846 (2005) (claiming that the Constitution itself is too flawed 
to support environmental laws, which has resulted in the confusion and conflict over the current 
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would allow Congress to enact environmental laws without the use of the 
Commerce Clause, in an effort to protect a precious resource common to 
all people. In addition, a precautionary principle should be adopted 
especially concerning threats of irreversible damage to the 
environment. 226 
Environmental impacts are felt on local, national, and global 
scales.228 Those impacts cross state lines and know no boundaries of 
race or ethnicity.229 An environmental amendment would not only 
substantively solve the issue of intrastate, non-economic protections, but 
might also signal a paradigm shift in this country in recognizing the right 
to a healthy environment. 
Many other countries have incorporated some sort of declaration in 
favor of environmental protection and stewardship of the Earth in their 
Constitutions.23o These declarations come in the form of preambles, 
rights, duties and fundamental freedoms that the government is required 
to protect.231 Modeling a Constitutional amendment for the United States 
after language from any number of countries would not only promote 
environmental freedoms in our own country, but would make an 
international statement that the United States is prepared to be 
responsible for its environment and future inhabitants. 
Environmental problems are unlikely to diminish in the near future. 
More environmental laws are needed with each passing decade to 
address these problems that are not diminishing, but rather growing in 
number and intensity. We need to recognize this epidemic by ensuring 
the passing and enforcement of more aggressive environmental laws. 
Passing an environmental constitutional amendment would guarantee the 
stability of environmental laws, and would increase the predictability in 
regards to the Supreme Court upholding them or not. 
environmental agenda). 
226 See e.g, RIO DECLARATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Principle IS, 
available at 
http://www .unep.orgIDocuments.multilinguallDefault.asp ?DocumentID= 78&ArticleID= 1163 
227 See e.g., STOCKHOLM DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Principle 21, 
available at 
http://www.unep.orgIDocuments.multilinguallDefault.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503 
228 See supra note 219. 
229 [d. 
230 Don Anton, Australia -- Comparative Constitutional Language for Environmental 
Amendments to the Australian Constitution, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, May 
31, 2006, http://www.elaw.org!resources/text.asp?ID=1082. 
231 [d. 
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2. ESA Amendment 
A statutory amendment to the ESA has many advantages over a 
Constitutional Amendment, but also exerts less power over the stability 
of future environmental laws due to its narrow focus. 232 To be effective, 
an ESA amendment would have to safeguard against the deficiencies 
found in the statutes by Lopez and Morrison, as follows. 233 
The Lopez Court identified four factors that could aid the Court in 
its determination of an activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce?34 First, an activity is more likely to substantially affect 
interstate commerce when it involves "commerce" or some kind of 
economic enterprise.235 Second is the presence of a jurisdictional 
element "which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry" that the 
activity affects interstate commerce.236 Third is whether or not findings 
exist to expressly support the notion that the activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce.237 Fourth is the causal link between the activity and 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and whether that link is too 
attenuated?38 If Congress amended the ESA so as to block future 
judicial challenges based on the four Lopez factors, the Supreme Court 
would likely find the ESA constitutional even under Lopez's strict 
framework. 
By amending the ESA to clarify the statute through additional 
language or additional findings, Congress would evince its intent in 
passing the ESA through the Commerce Clause. Primarily, Congress can 
design this amendment after one of two options. The first option is 
tailored after Rancho Viejo's attempt to define the regulated activity of 
the ESA.239 The second option follows the concurrence in NAHB in 
recognizing Congress's power to prevent destructive interstate 
competition.24o 
a. Option 1: Defining Development as the Regulated Activity 
The Rancho Viejo majority identified the ESA's regulated activity 
232 An amendment to a statute can be passed quicker, and altered easier. In addition, it will be 
more narrowly tailored to the particular problems with the ESA. 
233 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559·560; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-619. 
234 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-560. 
235 Id. at 559. 
236 Id. at 560. 
237 1d. 
238 1d. 
239 See infra notes 241-257 and accompanying text. 
240 See infra notes 258-264 and accompanying text. 
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as the offending activity, which is economic in nature and substantially 
affects interstate commerce?41 By defining the regulated activity of the 
ESA, Rancho Viejo attempts to clarify the statute and offer the Supreme 
Court direction in interpreting the ESA. Though not decided solely on 
this rationale, the Gibbs court also supported the idea that economic 
motivations can be used to satisfy the "economic" requirement of 
Lopez. 242 However, the Supreme Court will likely accept this rationale 
only if it is clear that Congress intended it. If the legislature were clearly 
to spell out that the ESA's regulated activity is the offending activity, 
then the Supreme Court would most likely defer.243 
Unfortunately, this option exposes a problem of scope.244 Under 
Rancho Viejo's rationale, the ESA's "take" provision will only be 
constitutional if the regulated activity in any given situation is 
economically motivated. This would exclude the non-economically 
motivated taker from being covered under the ESA.245 In addition to the 
scope of this rationale being too narrow, it might be too broad as well. 
Some argue that this rationale covers nearly every situation where a 
taking of an endangered species occurs since most activity that would 
take a species occurs due to some sort of economic incentive.246 
Aside from the criticism this option receives,247 an amendment 
using this rationale could easily dispel confusion as to what the regulated 
activity of the ESA is, solving one of the problems that the precedent 
creates. By Congress conveying its clear intent, the judiciary would 
defer to the plain language included in the ESA amendment.248 
Additionally, an amendment tailored after this approach would include 
241 Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072; [d. at 1080 (Ginsburg, 1., concurring) 
242 [d. 
243 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (declared a two part 
test now known as the "Chevron deference", whereby the Court, in reviewing an agency 
interpretation will first determine whether the plain language of the statute is clear, and in finding 
that it is not, will defer to that agency interpretation so long as it is reasonable). 
244 See Ziel, supra note 182, at 187-190 (discussing the drawbacks to taking an approach as in 
Rancho Viejo). 
245 Without a jurisdictional element, the non-commercially motivated take and the 
commercially motivated take are treated the same which causes issues with the facial validity of the 
ESA, passed under the Commerce Clause. See Adler, supra note 196, at 775 ("A teenager's spiteful 
use of a slingshot can be just as criminal as a developer's profit-seeking use of land movers." 
Concerning a facial challenge, ''the federal government's authority to regulate both activities will 
rise or fall together"). 
246 See Adler, supra note 20, at 409 (stating that not only is the rationale in Rancho Viejo too 
broad, but it is in contention with Lopez); See also Matthews, supra note 8, at 948 (stating that 
Rancho Viejo has shortcomings, but they are a reflection of the poor framework of Lopez and 
Morrison). 
247 See Ziel, supra note 182. 
248 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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findings which would conclude that the majority of takings occur 
because of commercial development or economic motivations by way of 
poaching or illegal trafficking. An amendment of this nature would work 
primarily because it would allow little opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to formulate an activist decision, either for or against the ESA. An ESA 
amendment would allow the Supreme Court to look to the plain language 
alone, which many of the justices would agree is the most accurate 
method of statutory interpretation?49 
An amendment drafted in this way satisfies three of Lopez's four 
requirements, supra?50 First, by defining the regulated activity as the 
thing that causes the takings, the regulated activity becomes economic in 
nature as long as the offending activity is an economic endeavor.251 
Second, the Comment suggests adding findings to support the conclusion 
that the activity causing the takes is the regulated activity of the ESA.252 
Though the existence of findings is not determinative as to whether or 
not the statute will be found constitutional,253 the Supreme Court has 
criticized statutes without such findings and found those statutes to be 
unconstitutional.254 Also, the causal link between the regulated activity 
and commerce is clear when the takings occur as a result of an economic 
endeavor.255 To satisfy Lopez's fourth factor, Congress might also 
include a jurisdictional element which would provide that the ESA can 
only regulate those things that substantially affect interstate commerce, 
are an instrumentality of interstate commerce or are channels of interstate 
commerce. Like the absence of findings, the absence of a jurisdictional 
element is not fatal. 256 However, Lopez heavily criticized the Gun Free 
School Zone Act for lacking a jurisdictional element that would more 
readily link the activity to interstate commerce.257 
249 See Claeys, supra note 193, at 797 (Justice Scalia is a strict constructionist, "erring on the 
side of minimalism" (Id.)). 
250 See supra 234-238 notes and accompanying text. 
251 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1072. 
252 See supra note 237. 
253 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1069 (stating that " ... neither findings nor legislative history is 
necessary"). 
254 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasizing that though " ... Congress is not normally required 
to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce," 
they aid the Court in finding a connection where one is not apparent to the naked eye). 
255 Rancho Viejo, 130 F.3d at 1068 (comparing the instant case to NAHB in that both involve 
regulated activities that are characterized as economic development, creating a clear connection to 
interstate commerce). 
256 Id. (stating that the absence of a jurisdictional hook did not dissuade the NAHB Court 
from finding the ESA constitutional). 
257 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
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b. Option 2: Preventing a "Race to the Bottom" Among the Several 
States 
The NAHB court concurrence held that the taking of species can be 
regulated as something that substantially affects interstate commerce 
because it is the product of destructive interstate competition, something 
that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.258 This theory of 
preventing a "race to the bottom" is tied closely with the concerns of 
allowing states to hold exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate species, 
supra?59 
An amendment should state that Congress utilized its power to 
prevent destructive interstate competition between states in passing the 
ESA through the Commerce Clause. Language of this nature would 
provide a basis for the Supreme Court to find that regulating intrastate 
activity pursuant to the ESA's take provision is within Congress's power. 
Given the statistics of existing destructive interstate competition, 260 
regulating intrastate takes are necessary to achieve that important 
governmental purpose. Without federal regulation of intrastate takes, 
states might adopt their own loose protections in order to introduce new 
industry within their borders.261 This argument is closely tied to the 
many problems that exist with giving states exclusive authority to protect 
intrastate species, supra.262 The distribution of species across the states 
is overwhelmingly disproportionate.263 In addition to distribution 
concerns, not all states may share the vision of protecting species to the 
extent mandated by the ESA. The Court has established that federal 
regulation is appropriate to prevent this destructive interstate 
competition.264 
C. AFFIRMING THE COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME RATIONALE 
Relying heavily on the reasoning in Morrison, the GDF court stated 
that a regulated activity may be considered economic when it is an 
essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme, which could be 
258 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053. 
259 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
260 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053-1057 (discussing the different activities that the Court has found 
to be vulnerable to destructive interstate competition). 
261 See supra note 221. 
262 1d. 
263 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 889 (4th ed. 2003). 
264 See supra note 258. 
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undercut but for the particular intrastate regulation. 265 In showing a 
regulatory scheme, the court used the original ESA findings. 266 These 
findings evinced a clear economic regulatory purpose in enacting the 
ESA to combat the accelerated extinction rate due to economic 
activity,z67 Discussed in the opinion, House Report No. 93-412 and 
Senate Report No.91-526 illustrate how the ESA's protections are 
economic in nature. 268 Though the GDF court reiterated that the Cave 
Species Spider is not economic or commercial in any way,269 the 
economic effects of biodiversity as well as the economic motivations 
present behind the takes give an economic character to the takes 
themselves. 27o In addition to requiring the larger regulation to be 
directed at economic activity,271 GDF also reiterates that the activity 
needs to be an "essential" component to the larger regulatory scheme.272 
Even de minimus takes are essential to prevent undercutting the goals of 
the ESA by preventing piecemeal extinction.273 
The Supreme Court should follow GDF for three primary reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court used the comprehensive-scheme rationale in 
deciding Raich, 274 which is now binding precedent.275 The concern, 
however, in applying Raich is that many factual differences exist 
between the CSA and the ESA which might cause a different outcome 
for the ESA.276 Since this Comment suggests that Raich was a product of 
judicial activism,277 it cannot predict whether the Roberts Court will 
honor Raich by applying it to the ESA or whether it will read it narrowly 
so as to limit its impact on other areas of law. If the Court chooses to 
adhere to the rationale in Raich, it is likely that the Court would also 
uphold the ESA in subsequent challenges.278 The second reason the 
Court should follow GDF is that safeguards exist within the 
265 GDF, 326 F.3d at 630. 
266 [d. at 638. 
267 Id. at 639; 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1973). 
268 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4). 
269/d. at 625. 
270 /d. at 639. 
271/d. 
272 /d. 
273 Id., at 640. 
274 Raich, 125 S.C!. at 2203 ("Congress devised a closed regulatory system"). 
275 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 (This rationale was also discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs 
though was not central to its holding because Gibbs already found that the red wolves themselves 
were economic in nature (Id. at 271 )). 
276 See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text. 
278 See Ziel, supra note 182. 
33
Maier: Outgrowing the Commerce Clause
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
522 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
comprehensive scheme rationale to prevent it from being too narrow or 
overbroad. As discussed in GDF, the individual activity must be an 
essential component to the comprehensive scheme, with its deregulation 
undercutting the entire scheme.279 This provides a two step analysis, 
supra,280 which can ensure limited, yet adequate scope. The final reason 
why the Court should follow GDF is that the Fifth Circuit actually 
unifies the seemingly splintered circuit court decisions. Despite GDF's 
refusal to define the regulated object of the ESA as the offending 
activity,28I it still uses economic motivation to characterize the takes as 
economic?82 The court is therefore looking to the offending activity to 
define whether or not the takes are economic. Ironically, GDF arrives at 
a similar conclusion as Rancho Viejo and others that believe the ESA is 
regulating the offending activity. In addition, by using economic 
motivation and economic effects of biodiversity loss as arguments to 
characterize the Cave Species takes as economic, the court utilizes the 
rationales from both Gibbs and NAHB, respectively.283 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the past thirty-three years, the ESA has been providing the basis 
for protecting some of the world's most precious and irreplaceable 
resources. The reasons for the ESA's existence are the same as they 
were thirty-three years ago, and the proponents and critics are pleading 
the same arguments they were pleading thirty-three years ago. Though 
much has stayed the same, the aspects that have changed signal a dark 
future for the ESA and the environmental movement. Though this 
Comment contends that the ESA's constitutionality is headed down a 
troubled path on its likely journey to the Supreme Court, it also proposes 
solutions that would increase the likelihood of the ESA's survival. An 
amendment to the ESA, in conjunction with the Supreme Court adopting 
the comprehensive scheme rationale from GDF and Raich, would 
provide the best short term protections for the future of the ESA. 
This Comment intentionally omits possible solutions based solely 
on Gibbs' "incubator for commerce" theor/84 and NAHB' s "option value 
279 GDF, 326 F.3d at 638·639. 
280 See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
281 GDF, 326 F.3d at 634 (maintaining that, " ... Congress, through the ESA, is not directly 
regulating commercial development"). 
282 [d. at 639. 
283 See supra notes 73-79, 81 & 88. 
284 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 (claiming that the red wolves are economic, the court states that 
they provide for revenue based on several activities making them "incubators for commerce"). 
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nexus,,285 for two reasons. First, in the case of Gibbs, the theory is too 
narrow to fully protect species to the extent that the ESA mandates, due 
to the inherent requirement that the species generate some sort of 
tangible, economic revenue.286 Second, NAHB's "option value nexus" is 
too speculative to survive the Court's heightened rational basis review. 287 
The Gibbs court relies heavily on statistical data to support its claim 
that red wolves provide a range of commercial enterprises. The court 
creates the connection to commerce by finding that the species provides 
a basis for 1) tourism, 2) academic study or 3) a presumed market for 
goods after the species is no longer endangered.288 The Gibbs rationale 
of using species as "incubators for commerce" was later recognized in 
GDF as valid only in those circumstances where supporting data can be 
brought forth, as in Gibbs.289 Some species do not have economic value 
in the sense that this reasoning would require, and would therefore not be 
covered by this finding. 29o 
The NAHB majority's reasoning, that the "option value" of 
endangered species creates a link from those species to commerce, is 
attenuated and would not survive a heightened rational basis review. The 
Court would not find that this nexus is rational based on the easily 
dismissed findings from Morrison. 29i 
While the concurrence in NAHB makes a strong point in that 
extinction as a whole has a real and predictable effect on interstate 
commerce by limiting genetic diversity,292 the "option value" of a species 
does not provide a certain enough link to commerce. Though many 
species provide commercially marketable products, many do not. To 
protect all species based on their individual, potential contribution to 
commerce is too attenuated. 
The Supreme Court could easily dismiss NAHB's option value 
nexus as a rational basis even though the rationale is still highly revered 
among scholars and scientists?93 A loss of biodiversity could be 
devastating for a number of reasons. 294 Many think that cures for thus-
285 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-1053 (stating that species loss diminishes a potential resource 
that could be used for commercial purposes). 
286 Gibbs. 214 F.3d at 493. 
287 Id. at 490. (recognizing that this is a "rational basis review with teeth"). 
288 Id. at 492-497. 
289 GDF, 326 F.3d at 637. 
290 Id. at 638 ("Cave Species takes are neither economic nor commerciaL"). Id. 
291 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614-615. 
292 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-1060. 
293 EDWARD WILSON, BIOPHILIA, 121 (1984). 
294 T.V.A, 437 U.S. at 178-179 (citing H.R.Rep. No.93-412 at 4-5 (1973) ("From the most 
narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic 
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far incurable diseases lurk deep in the rainforests or deserts?95 Some 
think that a loss of one species could set off a catastrophic chain of 
events that would lead to a drastic imbalance in the ecosystem.296 The 
lure of assigning value to biodiversity through an option value theory 
will never disappear from the realm of environmental law. However 
appealing the rationale is, that an insect in the middle of the desert might 
hold the cure for a debilitating disease, the legal system limits what is 
acceptable in the eyes of the Court. In Morrison, the Court held that the 
findings regarding the impacts of gender-motivated violence would open 
the door to unlimited Congressional power to regulate just about 
anything,z97 Just as the findings in Morrison were too attenuated to 
survive, the findings here might wither as well at the hands of an even 
more conservative Supreme Court.298 Fortunately, other remedies exist 
to protect these species so that we can realize their value in time, and 
within the confines of the legal system. 
While many had speculated that the ESA might be in trouble, recent 
events only confirm such fears. This law review topic was developed 
before President Bush appointed John Roberts or Samuel Alito, before 
the Supreme Court decided Raich, before Congressman Pombo proposed 
a weakening of the ESA, and before the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on the first CW A cases in five years. Many solutions offer valuable 
opportunities for the ESA and the future of environmental laws in 
general. We can only hope that by the time the next article is written on 
this subject, it will speak to the prosperous existence of the ESA and not 
its difficult fight for survival. 
JENNIFER A. MAIER' 
variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources.")). 
295 [d. at 178 ("Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other scourges, 
present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much 
less analyzed?"). 
296 [d. at 178-179 ("Congress was concerned about ... the unforeseeable place such creatures 
may have in the chain of life on this planet"). 
297 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-616. 
298 [d. 
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AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT: 
After this Comment was finalized for press in the middle of 
February 2006, two wetland cases were argued before the Supreme 
Court, which continues to shape the controversy surrounding the ESA's 
. . I' 299 constltutlOna tty. 
On February 21, 2006, the Supreme Court heard arguments from the 
two consolidated wetland jurisdiction cases, Rapanos v. United States 
and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, challenging the 
applicability of the Clean Water Act.300 In the transcripts of the Rapanos 
and Carabell arguments, Justice Scalia's aggressive questioning and 
Chief Justice Roberts' penchant for questioning both sides about the 
definitions of such terms as "tributary" and "hydrological connection," 
set the tone of the new Court.30 ! Although, Justice Souter made a "take-
home" point by identifying the weakness in the Petitioner's arguments, 
that any polluter could "get away scot-free" if they "dump the pollutant 
further-- far enough upstr~am in the watershed.,,302 . 
Justice Kennedy, however, may hold the key to unlocking the 
mystery as to how applicable these wetlands cases would be to an ESA 
case at the Supreme Court level. In the transcript, Justice Kennedy 
expresses his concern over stripping states of their rights to govern water 
and land resources. 303 Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in 
SWANCC, but has voted also with the majority in other cases that were 
decided in favor of heavier environmental protection like Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw. 304 This disparity in his opinions demonstrates his pro-
states rights stance, even in environmental cases. If an ESA case were to 
be decided by the current Supreme Court, based on Justice Kennedy's 
record and his comments in the Rapanos/Carabell arguments, the ESA 
throughout this process and his loving support in both law school and life. 
299 See infra note 300. 
300 Transcript of Oral Argument. Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-1034 (argued Feb. 21, 
2006), 2006 WL 496220; Transcript of Oral Argument, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 
04-1384 (argued Feb. 21, 2006), 2006 WL 496220. 
301 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Rapanos & Carabell, 2006 WL 496220 (Nos. 04-
1034 & 04-1384). 
302 [d. at 14-15. 
303 [d. at 58. 
304 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159; Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. !67 (2000); see 
generally, Anthony Kennedy on the Environment, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.orglCourtlAnthony_Kennedy_Environment.htm. 
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proponent should point out the differences between wetland protections 
and the ESA, supra.305 It is in this way that the argument will appeal to 
Justice Kennedy's interest in maintaining state sovereignty. 
While this Comment still contends that wetland jurisdiction cases at 
the Supreme Court level might indicate how the Court will treat 
subsequent ESA cases, the Rapanos and Carabell arguments seem to 
sidestep broader constitutional implications, as did the Court in 
SWANCc. 306 The Court's narrow questioning pertained mostly to 
statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act, which might lead to a 
narrow holding, as in SWANCC. This indicates the Court's reluctance to 
deal with the Commerce Clause issue if they are not wholly confronted 
with it. Regardless, these cases will have some impact on future ESA 
cases and many are anxiously awaiting a Court opinion. 
Although these arguments and subsequent judicial theories all 
occurred after this Comment was finalized for press, the issue of the 
ESA's constitutionality remains undecided. In general, this issue has 
been becoming more volatile as development continues to increase and 
more and more species become endangered or extinct every day. So 
while the Rapanos/Carabell arguments were not able to be included 
substantively in this Comment, one would hope that readers will be 
inspired to continue to follow this issue and take action when 
appropriate. 
305 See supra notes 171-179. 
306 See supra note 49. 
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